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Il/legitimate risks? Occupational health and safety and the public in Britain, c. 
1960–2015 
 
The last 20 years have seen the emergence of a popular climate of antipathy towards 
occupational health and safety regulation in the UK, particularly within the mainstream 
British media.1 The emergence of a narrative of ‘health and safety gone mad’ has been 
mirrored by a hardening of government policy around risk regulation, including a 
reduction of resources, a rolling back of the legislative framework, and the adoption of a 
policy-making rhetoric of ‘red tape’ and ‘sensible risk regulation’.2  The governance of 
health and safety has thus in recent years become an increasingly visible and contested 
public and political issue. 
 The extent of this contestation and its impact on health and safety in the 
workplace and beyond requires explanation and historicization. Why, in recent years, 
has public rhetoric about health and safety become so important in framing the ways in 
which the State might legitimately act? Where does public opinion fit into the longer 
history of preventing deaths and injuries in modern Britain? In a volume interested in 
pluralizing notions of how risk has been governed and by whom, it may seem counter-
intuitive to focus on the State, an institution thoroughly explored by an earlier 
generation of historians, as the introduction to this volume has noted. Yet, we can affirm 
the agency of the State whilst also attending, as this chapter does, to the shifting place 
and input of the public; and more especially to how public opinion came to exercise a 
key role in the formation and legitimacy of health and safety regulation, which is largely 
a product of recent decades. 
 This development forms part of a broader history of governance in which the 
State has taken account of constituencies much beyond the realms of formal regulatory 
processes. Indeed, the State was never a monolithic or domineering agent, even during 
the heyday of the so-called ‘classic’ post-war Welfare State. Actions were always 
negotiated with multiple interested parties, collectively forming what Christopher 
Sellers and Joseph Melling have recently called the ‘industrial hazard regime’.3 As we 
shall see, there were peaks and troughs in the extent to which the many actors involved 
were able to influence the State’s approaches to health and safety. Trade unionism was 
particularly significant up to the 1970s; whereas employers became increasingly 
influential in the 1980s. Meanwhile, safety organizations (such as the Royal Society for 
the Prevention of Accidents) and pressure groups (such as the Society for the Prevention 
of Asbestos and Industrial Diseases) struggled to gain long-lasting purchase throughout, 
commanding attention only at particular moments. But what is most striking is that from 
the 1980s one set of actors assumed an increasingly important and influential role, both 
as an actor and as a point of reference: ‘the public’. 
 To be sure, the public was never a uniform entity, something recognized at the 
time. As Bill Simpson, Chair of the Health and Safety Commission (HSC) – the 
management board overseeing the post-1974 regulatory system – observed in 1982: ‘I 
even find it difficult to grasp sometimes what “public concern” actually means, or what 
“the wider public” means.’4 Temporary coalitions of opinions emerged at particular 
points and the public always expressed a multiplicity of views. Nonetheless, the public 
gradually assumed a central place in debates about the legitimacy of health and safety. 
This was not, however, simply a product of growing governmental accountability per 
se. Rather, it reflected a new kind of accountability that emerged in the wake of a 
gradual dissolution of more tripartite forms of governance. It also reflected the advent of 
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a new political and administrative culture that was pro-business, sceptical of ‘red tape’ 
and keen to embrace more efficient styles of public management. As we shall see, the 
key change was from a relatively long-standing and limited conception of the 
governance focused around industrial stakeholders – employers, workers and regulators 
especially – to one rooted in a much more diffuse coalition of interested parties, 
including the public. This began, we suggest, in the mid-1980s, followed by a period of 
consolidation in the years after 2000. 
 
 
A culture of tripartism: 1960–85 
 
The modern regulatory system governing occupational health and safety (OHS) reaches 
back into the early nineteenth century. It began with the creation of an official Factory 
Inspectorate in 1833, which remained the lynchpin of the system beyond the Second 
World War. The creation and longevity of this body might be seen in terms of a 
sustained climate of progressive opinion, a view famously put forward by the jurist 
A.V. Dicey in the early twentieth century.5 It is certainly true that factory inspection 
was gradually better resourced and that inspectors were slowly equipped with greater 
powers of enforcement. Regulations became more exacting, especially in relation to 
working conditions: the Factories Act of 1937, for instance, was a mammoth piece of 
legislation, specifying sanitary conditions, the safeguarding of machinery, the provision 
of fire exits and procedures for notifying accidents, among much else. 
 In fact, as historians have shown, these achievements were only secured through 
intensely complex processes of negotiation and compromise, and there was little, if any, 
direct engagement with public opinion more broadly.6 Instead, the public dimension, 
such as it was, was restricted to employers, employees and trade unions. As early as the 
mid-Victorian period, inspectors were urged to practice diplomacy when advising or 
admonishing employers. It was axiomatic that persuasion was more reliable – and 
cheaper – than legal action: a sentiment that was just as pronounced in the inter-war 
period. Similarly, tactics of education and consultation were judged critical throughout, 
and by the 1930s, as Helen Jones has described, a loosely tripartite culture of 
governance had arisen in which inspectors regularly liaised with manufacturers’ 
associations and trades unions.7 Firms, for instance, voluntarily introduced safety 
committees that featured representatives of labour and management. Although none of 
this necessarily made for consensus, direct dialogue and tripartite consultation between 
the State, employers and employees was a part of both the formulation and 
implementation of health and safety measures. 
 This culture of broadly consensual, tripartite governance persisted into the post-
war period, when further legislation was passed, including the Factories Act of 1961. 
Inspectors, for instance, continued to insist on the limits of legislation and the need to 
educate (rather than coerce) workers and employers. As the Chief Inspector of Factories 
noted in his 1963 report: ‘both employers and workers are morally bound to accept 
responsibilities that are wider than those imposed by law ... Legislation cannot be a 
complete guide to what should be done.’8 Likewise, if moving in the other direction, 
trade unions and local authorities continued to lobby for greater State involvement. To 
give but one example, in the early 1970s the Dock and Harbour Authorities’ 
Association requested better and more extensive inspection, complaining of ‘a 
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considerable shortage of trained personnel in the Factory Inspectorate, particularly those 
familiar with dock operations and ports generally.’9 
 At the same time, debate remained largely confined to those groups with a direct 
and vested interest in OHS. Matters of workplace safety and health were not afforded 
great public importance.10 In 1972, the TUC General Secretary could note that ‘[m]ore 
people are interested in the antics of a certain lady and her butler or the Provost of 
Portsmouth Cathedral than in safety in industry.’11 Officials within the Factory 
Inspectorate seem to have held only a limited conception of public opinion, which was 
constructed largely in terms of knowledge about the workplace. In 1972, the Chief 
Inspector of Factories recorded that ‘it is part of the job of the Inspectorate to develop 
an informed public and to harness the force of its informed opinion to the improvement 
of industrial conditions.’12 Although the same report noted that ‘we are considering a 
much more active approach to the development of public opinion’, this was conceived 
in terms of informing the public about the work of the Inspectorate.13 On rare occasions, 
perhaps, significant disasters sparked considerable public interest and intense debate in 
the press regarding questions of industrial safety. This was true of the disaster at 
Aberfan, South Wales, in October 1966, when a primary school and much of the village 
were engulfed by a collapsed colliery spoil heap, resulting in the death of 144 people, 
the majority of whom were children. Yet media coverage was invariably short-lived and 
it was not necessarily related to the precise question of OHS.14 As Rex Symons, a 
former member of the HSC, has recently observed: ‘Aberfan didn’t strike one as being a 
health and safety issue, it struck you as being a public safety issue’.15 
 The approach taken by the Robens Committee and the subsequent Health and 
Safety at Work Act 1974 (HSWA) at once built on and formalized the existing culture 
of corporatist, tripartite governance. As Chris Sirrs’ chapter in this volume shows, the 
approach taken by Robens was driven by an ethos of ‘industrial self-regulation’ and a 
perceived ‘identity of interests’ between workers and employers. Underlying the 
Robens philosophy was a particular vision of risk governance that sought to co-opt the 
self-regulating capacities of workers and employers alike whilst limiting the role of the 
State and the use of formal, prescriptive methods, such as legally enforcing the precise 
specifications of factories acts. The result was the creation of the Health and Safety 
Executive (HSE), charged with implementing the HSWA and developing more formal 
and permanent consultative mechanisms.16 Crucial here was the HSE’s management 
board, the HSC, which was essentially tripartite, comprising representatives from 
industry, trade unions and local government, as well as safety experts and policymakers 
– all those actors that were understood as having a direct interest in OHS. In this way, 
by incorporating the input of a range of stakeholders, Robens sought to ensure that the 
new system of risk management was viewed as publicly acceptable, even if public 
opinions were not formally solicited within the tripartite structure. 
 Until the end of the 1970s, the governance of OHS was was thus characterized 
by a general lack of direct engagement with public opinion. It was not necessarily that 
members of the general public had no opinions on the issue of workplace safety and the 
risks that they faced; more that there was no means of expressing these opinions 
formally. As the Chair of the HSC observed in 1982 before a parliamentary select 
committee inquiring into the work of the HSE: ‘We are structured the way we are 
because of the Act of Parliament [the HSWA] which laid down in broad terms the sort 
of representative groups that would be appointed there’. The public was not one of 
them, although he went on: ‘I am not saying there that we do not take a note of public 
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concern, of course we do’.17 It seems the general understanding was that the public 
would be represented via the existing groups sitting on the HSC. As the General 
Secretary of the Associated Society of Locomotive Enginemen and Firemen informed 
the same committee: ‘The public interest is still well safeguarded by the local authority 
representatives on the Commission, especially the general public interest.’18 
 There are two key reasons for the lack of attention paid to general public opinion 
at this time. One is that health and safety was seen as a matter that only really concerned 
the workplace. As an article in the Times summed up in 1971, ‘Industrial safety is a dry 
subject which arouses the passions of a limited number of people directly concerned 
with preventing accidents at work.’19 Although Section 3 of the HSWA extended the 
responsibilities of employers to ‘persons not in his employment who may be affected’ 
by business activities, the full implications of this had not yet been developed or 
realized: at this point, the attention of employers, unions and regulators remained very 
much focused on workers. For the most part, regulators and policymakers remained 
wedded to viewing the relevant constituencies in narrow, tripartite terms, as indeed 
reflected in the very structure of the HSC.20 The assumption was that ‘the public’ was 
not really separable from ‘the working population’ and that the interests of this group 
were represented by trade unions. As the Chair of the HSC noted in 1982, ‘I often 
quarrel with the idea that, because a person contributes to a trade union, he 
automatically disqualifies himself from being a member of the public.’21 
 The second reason was that the policymaking process was principally concerned 
with a small and immediate range of issues relating to the day-to-day operation of OHS, 
rather than bigger issues which might make health and safety more politically 
contentious.22 In part this reflected longstanding aspirations to impartiality and attempts 
to depoliticize health and safety by removing it, as far as possible, from the wider (and 
often fraught) industrial relations context of the time. In 1972 the Chief Inspector of 
Factories stated that ‘impartial we must be, for no side – employer or workforce – has a 
monopoly of rectitude in safety and health at work. We must also exercise a strict 
impartiality if we are to hold – and deserve to hold – the trust of managers and 
workers’.23 In the absence of any institutional reason to look at public opinions, health 
and safety therefore retained a relatively narrow focus on issues which could be 
addressed via the existing approaches of the regulator. It even reflected what might be 
called the technocratic nature of the regulator at this time and its status as a body that 
was constituted to deal with a particular range of considerations in an avowedly 
scientific, apolitical way. It is telling that the prevailing culture of regulation was 
sometimes criticized on these grounds: in the early 1980s, the Labour MP John Golding 
questioned whether the HSC was not in fact a ‘conspiracy of science between workers 
and employers’.24 
 
 
A change of focus: 1985–2000 
 
During the 1980s fractures began appear in the relative consensus surrounding health 
and safety that had emerged in the preceding decades. The underlying principles of 
tripartite management and mediated public consultation were compromised as ‘health 
and safety’ became a more contested and politicized arena of State regulation. It became 
more and more difficult to conceive of health and safety as a narrow area of concern, fit 
only for the attention of employers, employees and unions. Accordingly, State agencies 
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such as the HSC had to pay attention to a much wider cross-section of opinion, 
including that of the public. In short, the governance of health and safety broadened and 
intensified and this impacted on the ways in which the State governed risks. 
How might this be explained? Underlying the shift were significant social and 
economic changes. Most notably, traditional heavy industries such as mining and 
shipbuilding declined, whilst service and office-based work increased in scale. 
Employment in mining and quarrying, for example, fell from over 527,000 in 1961 to 
around 164,000 in 1981, whereas jobs in administration and management rose from 
643,000 in 1961 to over 1,342,000 in 1981.25 These trends continued in the 1980s, 
dramatically reshaping the economic landscape in which risks were produced and 
governed. At the same time, the obligations and powers set out in Section 3 of the 
HSWA, which imposed a duty on employers and the HSE to consider the impact of 
occupational activities on people beyond the workplace, were increasingly developed 
and realized. One instance is gas safety in the home. In January 1985, an explosion at 
the Newnham House flats in Putney, London, killed eight people, which was thought to 
have been caused by the faulty installation of gas appliances by engineers. The HSE 
was called in to investigate, marking the first time the body had dealt with the problem 
of domestic gas safety.26 As David Eves, then Chief Inspector of Factories, later 
recalled: 
 
[t]hat accident was significant because it really elevated gas safety as an 
issue ... then everybody became aware that about 30 people a year were 
being gassed in their homes ... so we became involved with domestic gas 
issues. Now I think I'm right in saying this was the first time ... that we had 
powers, or even the willingness to enter domestic premises.27  
 
In short, health and safety reached broader and more varied constituencies than it had 
previously: it was no longer synonymous with ‘industrial safety’. 
Yet changes in the social and economic context and the nature of health and 
safety regulation do not by themselves explain the increased prominence of the public. 
In fact, we should acknowledge at least three other factors, in what was also a contested 
and contingent period of transition in the culture of regulation: a politicization of 
regulation under the Conservative governments of Margaret Thatcher and John Major; a 
run of large-scale disasters that prompted concerns about public safety; and the 
development of new ideas about assessing risks and measuring levels of public 
tolerability. In terms of the first factor, the neo-liberalism espoused by the Conservative 
governments of the 1980s and 1990s made for a hostile ministerial and administrative 
environment. Many accounts of HSE policy and practice during this period have 
highlighted the impact of a more avowedly anti-regulatory political climate on the way 
that health and safety was directed. This included, for instance, the imposition of cost-
benefit-oriented decision-making processes around regulations; scepticism about the 
value of personnel invested in inspection and enforcement; and greater pressure for 
political and legal accountability around decision-making.28 
The presumption, certainly, was that regulation constituted a negative, 
burdensome intervention; but this was also – and increasingly – subject to explicit 
articulation. According to a 1986 Government White Paper Building Businesses ... Not 
Barriers, health and safety regulations amounted to a form of ‘red tape’ that ‘forces 
people running businesses to follow a particular pattern or administrative process which 
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is not related to that business’.29 Together with other White Papers such as Lifting the 
Burden (1985), Building Businesses recommended that ‘along with a concerted effort to 
reduce the volume and burden of existing regulations, new arrangements should be 
established to ensure that the business dimension is properly taken into account in the 
framing of new regulations where these remain necessary’.30 Such sentiments were 
widespread: in 1988, the Guardian quoted a ‘senior government official’, who asserted 
that a ‘culture which is about enterprise, competition and profitability doesn’t want to 
concern itself too closely with issues of health and safety.’31 Health and safety was thus 
targeted for substantive reductions in the number of regulations, and there was a shift 
towards increased self-regulation and freedom from inspection. 
The elevation of health and safety into an object of party-political antipathy also 
broke with the more consensual and consultative culture of the 1960s and 1970s. 
Business interests were seen as both dominant and more legitimate compared to the 
interests of organized labour.32 The crude equation was of health and safety with trade 
union influence, declining traditional industries, unaccountable public bureaucracy, and 
‘outdated’ welfare politics.33 Yet, besides pronounced Tory antipathy towards the 
labour movement, the movement itself was suffering from falling membership, 
declining from a peak in union membership of 13,212,000 workers in 1979 to 7,898,000 
in 2000.34 As a result it became increasingly difficult for the various State agencies to 
overlook public opinion or, just as crucially, to assume that it was captured via the 
existing tripartite structure. In this context, reference to a wider public became 
unavoidable, whether one was for and against greater regulation. 
The second development was the sudden and dramatic visibility of health and 
safety issues in the mid- to late 1980s. Over four years a spate of high-profile industrial, 
organizational and public disasters involved significant loss of life and subsequent 
public concern. The King’s Cross London Underground fire in 1987 (31 fatalities), the 
Herald of Free Enterprise sinking in 1987 (189), the Piper Alpha oil rig fire in 1988 
(167), the Clapham Junction rail crash in 1988 (35), and the Hillsborough football 
stadium disaster in 1989 (96), among others, created a particular moment of public 
safety crisis. This was exacerbated by a backdrop of terrorism (IRA, ongoing; 
Lockerbie, 1988) and nuclear meltdown (Chernobyl, 1986), and had a significant effect 
on both the public and government. As the Guardian noted in 1988, additional 
responsibilities demanded by the government and EEC regulations, ‘combined with a 
series of disasters ... has put worker and public safety high on the agenda and the role of 
the HSE is being closely examined.’35 
This increased scrutiny led to major changes in the systems of regulation in 
particular industries and in the approaches and methods that were used.36 The offshore 
and rail industries, for instance, were now brought within the HSE directly (previously 
these pockets of safety work had been retained by the Government Departments 
responsible for running the industries), and the ‘safety case’ regime was more widely 
applied, whereby operators were granted licenses to practice on the basis of 
documentation submitted in advance to show that effective risk management procedures 
were in place. This was a much more anticipatory regime, with organizations taking 
responsibility for governing potential risks, rather than reacting to specific incidents and 
interventions as and when they happened.  
Crucially, public scrutiny also served as a bulwark against the deregulatory 
instincts of the governments of the day, providing a protective shield to regulators. As 
one Labour MP later recalled, ‘for virtually all of Margaret Thatcher’s government, I 
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think that they probably would have liked to have done things with the Health and 
Safety at Work Act but there were so many disasters, it was very difficult.’37 Following 
some of the large-scale disasters, a number of actors – including the public, the TUC 
and the Labour Party – put pressure on the Government about the reduced resources for 
the HSE. In response, the Director-General of the HSE was reported in the press as 
‘smiling discretely and welcom[ing] the political weight they are able to put behind his 
requests for more money and resources.’38  
It thus became very difficult for even a deregulatory government to take action 
that might be construed as exposing the general populace to risk, and post-disaster 
reforms tended to strengthen the hand of the regulators rather than weaken them. For 
example, at select committee hearings in 1988, the HSE was able to make a play for 
greater responsibility in the areas of offshore (following Piper Alpha), underground 
(following King’s Cross), and ferry (following the Herald) safety.39 By 1992, the same 
committee welcomed the HSE’s management ‘back here with responsibilities which we 
thought you should have back under your belt’.40 Starting in this period, government 
and regulators took a much greater interest in public attitudes to health and safety risks. 
Roger Bibbings, at that point Health and Safety Advisor at the TUC, recalled a meeting 
in the late 1980s: 
 
He [Director-General of the HSE] invited me to come and present from a 
TUC perspective to get the discussion going amongst his senior colleagues. 
So I said, “oh you need to look again at worker safety, and need to have a 
bigger view of worker safety”… not very long into this, he put his hand up 
and said, “no, no, no, stop my boy, stop … that’s worker safety. That’s a 
dead volcano,” he said. “The live volcano is public safety. That is what’s 
going to energise everyone.”41  
 
Not only, then, was the public becoming more prominent in directing political attention; 
it was increasingly noted by the regulators. 
The third development was more technical: the idea of the ‘tolerability of risk’. 
This continued a long-established trend for new technologies to become sites around 
which debates about safety and risk crystallized, for instance factories in the early 
Victorian period, the railways and the mines in the late nineteenth and early twentieth 
centuries, and, by the 1980s, the nuclear industry. The Sizewell B nuclear power station 
planning inquiry of 1982-7 in particular raised questions about how the safety 
calculations around nuclear sites should be made. It was proposed during the inquiry 
that HSE should explicitly assess ‘tolerable levels of individual and societal risk to 
workers and the public’ in relation to nuclear power.42 
This led to the publication in 1988 of a new framework for calculating the 
‘tolerability of risk’ in which health and safety regulators would seek to weigh 
probabilistic assessments of risk and the costs of prevention alongside a more informed 
sense of what was deemed appropriate by the public.43 This model embodied a new 
approach to governing risk. In particular, it allowed regulators like the HSE to frame 
calculations of what level of risk exists (how serious, how likely) and what is possible 
in terms of risk control (feasibility, costs and benefits) against the backdrop of 
judgements about the social acceptability of those risks (from ‘broadly acceptable’, 
through ‘tolerable’ to ‘unacceptable’).44 This then allowed for a more principled 
assessment of risk control to take place in high-hazard areas like nuclear power, where 
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the potential risks (and public attitudes towards them, especially after Chernobyl) might 
be extreme. As the then Chair of the HSC observed during select committee hearings in 
1988: ‘technological change is now probably swifter … the public has become 
increasingly conscious of and knowledgeable about its implications. The reassurance 
provided by a fully effective and respected state regulatory body is more and more 
important’.45 
The tolerability of risk framework became a highly influential document and 
was revised in 1992 and 2001 to make it applicable to a broader range of industries and 
sectors.46 It became widely admired for its efforts to put the balancing of public 
concerns and expert-led risk assessment on a systematic footing. At the same time, the 
HSE began to commission research into public opinion by organizations such as MORI. 
Many of these studies took the form of investigations into public attitudes towards and 
tolerance of high-risk industries, particularly among the specific populations who 
coexisted and interacted with them. All of these studies identified a public desire for 
regulation in these areas of risk and technological change.47 Indeed, risk-creating 
industries were not necessarily trusted and this created an opportunity for an agency like 
the HSE to stake a claim as a trusted agency that acted to advance the ‘public interest’, 
as opposed to the interests of profit-hungry businesses.48 The claim that regulation could 
and did counter incipient risk insecurity was thus reinforced by evidence that positioned 
health and safety as a matter of ‘externalities’, or costs accruing to parties not directly 
involved in the employment exchange.49 This served to rebut the characterization of 
regulation as a burden imposed illegitimately from outside upon autonomous 
organizations. If risk was not internal to businesses in the complex, interconnected 
modern world, then risk regulation from outside was implicitly legitimated. 
 
 
Regulating in public: 2000 onwards 
 
The period after approximately 2000 witnessed a consolidation and intensification of 
the trends that emerged from the mid-1980s. Two aspects might be highlighted: first, 
the systematic targeting of regulation, itself a product of increasing political sensitivity 
to perceptions of public opinion; and secondly, an increase in public scrutiny and 
demands for accountability. In terms of the former, the ‘better regulation’ agenda 
pursued by the New Labour governments of the late 1990s and early 2000s was 
significant. Established in 1997, the Better Regulation Task Force reflected values that 
were articulated during the previous Conservative governments. These were seen in the 
Force’s five guiding principles, which included a commitment to cost-benefit analyses, 
an ability to justify decisions publicly, and ideas about assessing the impact of 
regulations on business efficiency. The intention was to ensure that policy and practice 
meshed with the wider ideological and economic goals. Likewise, risk management 
continued to be devolved to a range of partner institutions, which in the case of health 
and safety included businesses. As regulations were increasingly questioned from 
within government and as further actors were brought into play, the governance of OHS 
broadened still further.50 
 One important step was the Revitalizing Health and Safety strategy of 1999, 
which was designed to reposition health and safety 25 years after the HSWA. It restated 
a need to focus on high-frequency risks and for the first time set targets for 
improvements in safety performance, reflecting pressures for increased public 
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accountability. At the same time, central government’s capacity to exert direct control 
over regulatory outcomes was weakened. This was a result of both the continuation of 
the self-regulatory agenda, which moved responsibility for risk management outside the 
State, and the associated government desire to step away from direct control of day-to-
day delivery.51 According to Bill Callaghan, formerly of the TUC and Chair of the HSC 
during the years 1999 to 2007: 
 
I do recall a conference ... Brown and Blair were there ... the finger was 
being pointed at a number of regulators. Not HSE, I think, directly ... [but] 
there was a very strong view in New Labour that there was too much 
regulation ... in the City and in the retailing sector there were a lot of 
complaints to the political powers that be about what they saw as excessive 
regulation ... It then led to [the] Hampton and Macrory [reviews] and so 
on.52 
 
The 2005 Hampton Review, entitled Reducing Administrative Burdens, recommended 
an easing of some regulations and the creation of a business-led body at the heart of 
government.53 The Macrory Review of Regulatory Penalties, which reported in 2006, 
also embraced notions of proportionality and accountability.54 
 New Labour thus continued in the direction of travel started under previous 
administrations. Indeed, the climate of anti-regulatory sentiment that developed from 
the mid-1980s only hardened, making for an ongoing cycle of public review and 
reflection about the purpose and legitimacy of health and safety regulation. This was 
partly prompted by a highly politicized media narrative of ‘health and safety gone mad’ 
and the now regular provision of stories of regulatory excess, which was especially 
pronounced in the tabloid press.55 Equally, attacks on the idea of regulation emerged 
with increasing ferocity from the business lobby and the Tory party, which sought to 
create a public perception that it was a matter of ‘petty or restrictive’ rules.56 In 2008, 
the then leader of the Conservative opposition, David Cameron, argued that ‘this whole 
health and safety, human rights act culture, has infected every part of our life … it’s not 
a bigger state we need: it’s better, more efficient government’. In 2012 and now in 
office, he stated that his Government’s ‘New Year’s resolution’ was ‘to kill off the 
health and safety culture for good. I want 2012 to [be] the year we get a lot of this 
pointless time-wasting out of the British economy and British life once and for all’.57 
 The desire to reshape the regulatory system in order to respond to ‘public 
opinion’ led to the Young (2010) and Löfstedt (2011) reviews, which both paid 
attention to the problem of public standing, recognizing its potential to impact adversely 
upon the ability of regulators to fulfil their mandates. The report of the Löfstedt review 
was, significantly, titled Reclaiming Health and Safety for All, explicitly putting the 
public at the heart of debate.58 Although Löfstedt determined that the existing regulatory 
system was broadly fit for purpose, Conservative Minister for Employment Chris 
Grayling claimed that ‘[b]y accepting the recommendations of Professor Löfstedt we 
are putting common sense back at the heart of health and safety’, suggesting that 
regulation had run out of control and away from public opinion.59 The promise of these 
reviews tended to reflect the deregulatory desires of the incumbent government, 
something noted in the Guardian following the announcement of the Young Review 
into the operation of health and safety law: ‘The review will delight the Tory leader’s 
spurned right wing, with the issue of over-restrictive rules filling many MPs’ 
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postbags.’60 The tendency for reforms to go beyond the conclusions of the reviews, 
however, suggests that those conclusions were not always to the liking of the 
commissioning politicians. Although Löfstedt recommended 35 per cent of health and 
safety regulations might be cut, the Government announced that over three years it 
expected to cut up to 50 per cent of regulations.61 
 The second theme evident in relation to regulation in general, and health and 
safety regulation in particular, was the persistence of public scrutiny and a desire for 
public accountability. This found expression in attempts to use corporate manslaughter 
rules to find senior management figures criminally culpable for deaths. Attempts to 
reform corporate manslaughter laws had been tied to public opinion since the mid-
1980s, following the failures of prosecutions arising out of the Herald of Free 
Enterprise disaster of 1987 and the Southall rail crash of 1997, both of which were 
linked to a lack of high-level managerial accountability. This particular facet was thus 
not entirely new, but it gathered momentum after 2000. Commentators and government 
continued to cite public concern as a central reason for introducing revisions of 
corporate homicide liability law, and significant reform was eventually secured in 
2006.62 
Equally, public attitudes remained hugely complex, characterized by either 
ambivalence about or unconcern with health and safety issues. Research published by 
Gary Slapper in 1999 argued that there was a broader public view that health and safety 
was, in Kit Carson’s term, ‘conventionalized’. Offences, for instance, were not viewed 
as ‘proper’ crimes.63 Although people might be aware of health and safety as an issue, it 
was perceived as a minor irritant rather than something more serious. This was certainly 
the view of Lawrence Waterman, a leading corporate health and safety consultant and 
formerly Head of Health and Safety at the Olympic Delivery Authority, who identified 
a ‘public perception of health and safety being a bit trivial, a bit interfering, getting in 
the way of the lives that we want to lead … Although there’s a degree of political 
maliciousness about it ... it does definitely weaken the opportunity we have for 
achieving what we want.’64 
Nonetheless, it is clear that in 2015 health and safety and risk governance remain 
contested issues, and most of in the media and for politicians.65 The focus groups 
conducted as part of the wider research project which underpins this chapter found 
evidence of an interplay between, on the one hand, an instinctive cynicism and rejection 
of ‘health and safety’ as boring and restrictive, and on the other, more considered and 
positive evaluations.66 It was thus perfectly possible for participants to regard the 
diffuse mechanisms currently in place to manage health and safety as interfering, overly 
risk-averse and contrary to ‘common sense’, and as something that empowered workers 
and had brought major improvements in working conditions. And while negative media 
perceptions and public opinions were shared, they were also understood as representing 
a particular agenda. Perhaps surprisingly, despite holding these negative opinions on 
some level, the idea of health and safety as morally a ‘correct’ thing was still almost 
universally endorsed as a vital part of modern society: 
 
As a citizen you feel, when people have got their act together as far as health and 
safety’s concerned, confident, that you’re being looked after, and that’s what 
you want … over the years we’ve got more confident about asking for these 
things, so there’s a sense of safety, people have got their act together67 
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[interviewer] Do you think it’s important to have health and safety laws in 
place? … [participants all together] YES!68 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
In 2015, the health and safety system might be characterized as being subject to ‘critical 
trust’ by the public at large.69 It is accepted at the level of general principle, but subject 
to heavy criticism at the level of implementation and experience. While the abstract 
principle of State intervention to ensure health and safety has remained robust, the 
pursuit of this has become increasingly politicized and fragmented in recent years. The 
regulatory system has increasingly bifurcated so as to split efforts by central 
government to change the political character of health and safety away from the 
implementation and delivery of day-to-day outcomes by non-State actors such as safety 
professionals.70 On both fronts, there is evidence of a disjunction between the ways 
health and safety is talked about and what it means in practice. 
 As we have argued, the present situation is a product of a complex set of 
developments which relate to changes both in the nature of regulation and in the broader 
social and political context. Since the 1960s the place of the public in the governance of 
health and safety has been of increasing importance. Conceptions of key stakeholders in 
health and safety altered slowly, if radically, moving from the long-standing ‘industrial’ 
interests of capital and labour to a more nuanced and diffuse group, including as a key 
player the public. Perhaps more significantly, since the mid-1980s, the place of public 
opinion in the State’s governance of health and safety risks has assumed a greater 
prominence. This grew out of the changing political and economic structure of the UK 
at this time, not least the gradual decline of trade unions and tripartite models of 
governing, coupled with the rise of a neo-liberal agenda: all developments that made 
health and safety and State intervention matters of significant political dispute. These 
developments also meant that the State – which had long paid heed to public opinion, if 
in relatively informal or intangible ways – took increasing steps to respond to public 
attitudes about health and safety at work and beyond. Crucially, this recognition of the 
role of the public further complicated the diffuse nature of risk governance. State action 
had always been but one mode of governing risks in modern Britain, but towards the 
end of the twentieth century public opinion added a further and significant layer of 
complexity. 
 From a long-term perspective, it might be pointed out that there have long been 
points of conflict about what health and safety means and how far the State ought to 
intervene in the activities of businesses and the lives of individuals. What is noticeable, 
however, is the degree to which efforts to systematize public attitudes as a factor within 
bureaucratic decision-making have coexisted with a recasting of these attitudes within 
broader political and social debates. On the one hand, these trends are connected, in that 
formal regulatory accountability to public scrutiny is a major element of the neo-liberal, 
managerial State.71 On the other hand, however, it seems that the emergence of a public 
anti-health and safety narrative has relatively little to do with formal issues of 
accountability, and more to do with the re-emergence of longstanding tensions around 
the role that State regulation should play in the settlement of competing interests around 
the everyday realities of work and public lives. If anything, these tensions are now less 
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deep-seated than in the past, but their expression is more prominent than it has been for 
some time. 
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